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CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM
DAN QUAYLE*
It was at the annual Judicial Conference of the Federal Circuit
during May 1991 that I first advanced some proposals for reforming
the nation's civil justice system. That presentation was largely over-
shadowed by the publicity associated with my address to the annual
meeting of the American Bar Association in Atlanta three months
later. The report from the President's Council on Competitiveness,
presented in conjunction with the ABA address, contained some
fifty specific proposals for reform.' I am pleased, however, that it
was the Judicial Conference of the Federal Circuit on the eve of its
tenth anniversary that provided the first forum for the reform effort.
The Federal Circuit itself was the result of a reform effort to elimi-
nate the problem of forum shopping in patent cases. 2 In 1982, Con-
gress established the Federal Circuit as the single court to handle all
appeals in patent cases by merging two previously existing courts
with limited grants ofjurisdiction.3 In its ten-year history, the court
has established the type of consistency that litigants should expect
from our court system by eliminating many of the inconsistencies
that existed in patent law prior to 1982.4
It is in the same tradition of reform that I present some of my
principal proposals here, including those that appear to have
aroused the greatest interest. Among the proposals are those that
will require changes to statutes at the federal and state level. Many
of those changes would be accomplished by the Access to Justice Act
of 1992, which was sent to Congress by the President on February 4,
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1. PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM IN
AMERICA (Aug. 1991) [hereinafter AGENDA FOR CIVILJUSTICE REFORM].
2. THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRcurr, A HISTORY 1982-
1990 236 (1991).
3. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 37 (codified
as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1988)).
4. THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, A HISTORY 1982-
1990 236-43 (1991).
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1992. 5 Others will require amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and Federal Rules of Evidence. A number of re-
forms have already been implemented without changes to statutes
or rules. Action on these reforms can begin immediately with the
cooperation and assistance of the courts and federal agencies. To
that end, President Bush signed Executive Order 12,778 on October
23, 1991, requiring federal agencies to take certain reform steps in
litigation conducted on behalf of the Executive Branch.
6
It bears emphasis that these reforms are procedural in nature-
directed at reforming the process of resolving disputes. They are
not intended to affect substantive rights. Furthermore, none of the
proposals by the Council is designed to close the courthouse doors
to any meritorious claim or to any person. Instead, the proposals
seek to open those doors and create more doors for people to vindi-
cate their rights by clearing court dockets to hear truly meritorious
claims.
BACKGROUND
Few would dispute the proposition that America has become a
litigious society and that the preferred method for resolving dis-
putes and achieving social reform is to file lawsuits. In 1989, close
to eighteen million new civil cases were filed in state7 and federal
courts, amounting to one lawsuit for every ten adults. In the federal
courts alone, the number of lawsuits filed each year has more than
quadrupled in the last thirty years-from approximately 51,000 in
19608 to almost 218,000 in 1990. 9 According to a recent article in
Forbes magazine, individuals, businesses, and governments spend
more than $80 billion a year directly in litigation costs and higher
insurance premiums and up to $300 billion indirectly, including the
costs of efforts to avoid liability.10
The proliferation of litigation, however, does not only affect the
domestic economy. A 1984 study commissioned by the U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce noted that product liability insurance costs of
5. 138 CONG. REC. S909 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1992); see S. 2180, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., 138
CONG. REC. 911 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1992) (containing text of bill presented to Senate); H.R.
4155, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., 138 CONG. REC. 260 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1992) (containing text of
bill presented to House).
6. Exec. Order No. 12,778, 56 Fed. Reg. 55,195 (1991).
7. STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT 1989 7 (Feb. 1991).
8. FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, WORKING PAPERS AND SUBCOMMITrEE REPORTS
30 (June 1, 1990) (drawing data from Table 5).
9. DIRECTOR OF ADMIN. OFF. OF U.S. CTs. ANN. REP. 133 (1990) (drawing data from
Table C).
10. Peter Brimelow & Leslie Spencer, The Plainiffs Attorneys' Great Honey Rush, FORBES,
Oct. 16, 1989, at 203.
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foreign competitors were often twenty to fifty times lower than
those of U.S. companies.Il In addition, a survey of over 250 Ameri-
can companies revealed that more than three-quarters of the execu-
tives believe that the United States will be increasingly
disadvantaged in world markets unless modifications are made in
the liability system.
12
Furthermore, a recent survey by the Conference Board, a group
of 3600 organizations in over fifty nations, reported that potential
liability concerns caused 47% of U.S. manufacturers to withdraw
products from the market, resulted in 25% of U.S. manufacturers
discontinuing some forms of product research, and prompted ap-
proximately 15% of U.S. companies to lay off workers as a direct
result of product liability experience.13
As noted above, a report to the President issued by The Council
on Competitiveness in August 1991 contained recommendations for
changes to the current civil litigation process. The proposals for
reform were derived from the efforts of a working group established
under the umbrella of the Council which I chair. The working
group, chaired by Solicitor General Kenneth W. Starr, was
chartered to examine the existing civil justice process and prepare
recommendations. These recommendations are geared toward re-
ducing excessive and unnecessary litigation and decreasing the costs
and time associated with resolving disputes under the process.
14
The working group was composed of representatives from the
White House Counsel's Office, the Domestic Policy Council, the Of-
fice of the Vice President, the Office of Management and Budget,
the Council of Economic Advisors, the Environmental Protection
Agency, and the Departments of Justice, Commerce, Treasury, and
Energy. The report contains some of the following proposed
reforms.
VOLUNTARY DISPUTE RESOLUTION
To reduce the amount of unnecessary litigation, the Council rec-
ommends increasing the use of several procedural techniques and
providing greater access to alternative dispute resolution (ADR)
11. AMERICAN TEXTILE MACH. ASS'N, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, COOPERATIVE AGREE-
MENT No. 99-26-07151-10, AN INTERNATIONAL STUDY OF PRODUCT LIABILITY COSTS AND SYS-
TEMS FOR FIVE DOMESTIC MACHINERY INDUSTRIES 299 (1984).
12. E. PATRICK MCGUIRE, THE CONFERENCE BD., RES. REP. No. 908, THE IMPACT OF
PRODUCT LIABILITY 6 (1988).
13. Id. at 20 (drawing data from Table 30).
14. AGENDA FOR CIVILJUSTICE REFORM, supra note 1, at 7-9.
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techniques, making them routinely available as a substitute for
litigation.
Because the vast majority of civil lawsuits are settled or otherwise
disposed of prior to trial, the Council encourages mandatory settle-
ment conferences soon after the commencement of any litigation.
Mandatory settlement conferences would compel the parties to
reevaluate their claims and litigation positions. These required
meetings promote settlement earlier in the process because there
are more opportunities to narrow issues. Mandatory conferences
can also reduce posturing by lawyers who perceive that initiating
settlement discussions will be seen as a sign of weakness. Further-
more, ADR encourages parties to evaluate their claims closely and
attempt to settle their dispute. Settlement offers advanced prior to
trial should be reinforced with financial incentives such as requiring
the party who rejects the compromise to bear the additional costs of
trial unless the outcome at trial exceeds the settlement offer.
The Council suggests that, before resorting to the courts, litigants
should be required to notify the opposing parties of their intention
to file suit. A pre-complaint notice requirement provides both par-
ties with an opportunity to resolve the dispute at the earliest stage.
The parties would have the opportunity to reach an agreement and
fashion an appropriate remedy at lower transaction costs and with-
out the constraints of court rules or requirements. At the same
time, the dispute would be resolved without burdening the court.
These steps and the use of ADR techniques such as early neutral
evaluation, mediation, arbitration, and summary jury trials, should
greatly reduce the burden on the courts. Requiring the parties to
explore ADR options at the initial stages of the proceedings would
motivate attorneys to analyze the case and prepare basic investiga-
tive homework at a much earlier point than required by the tradi-
tional system. Although the parties would be given opportunities to
choose ADR, they would not be required to do so. This voluntary
approach avoids the danger of creating an additional, and costly,
obstruction through which litigants must first travel before they
enter the litigation system.
The primary advantage of ADR is that it allows parties to avoid
the time and expense of formal court proceedings. Unfortunately,
these benefits may not be adequately publicized. Only when law-
yers, business leaders, and government officials take the initiative in
disseminating the important message that ADR achieves justice will
the full advantages be realized.
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The Council also encourages the private sector to employ con-
tract provisions establishing non-judicial means of dispute resolu-
tion in order to introduce ADR into the corporate process.15
DISCOVERY
Rather than narrowing issues for trial, pretrial discovery is fre-
quently the source of needless delay and expense. Currently, liti-
gants have virtually unlimited ability to take sworn depositions of
witnesses, request documents, and submit written questions to par-
ties. The current rules governing discovery permit parties relatively
free access to the most private documents of their adversary. An
especially burdensome part of discovery is the taking of depositions,
which often last for several days and occasionally even weeks. Use
of interrogatories is also potentially intrusive and burdensome. The
most onerous aspect of discovery, however, is the document de-
mand whereby litigants can force the opposing party to open all of
their filing cabinets to inspection. Although discovery requests are
relatively inexpensive to make, the responding party's costs can be
staggering, involving the time of employees to produce materials,
attorney fees for review of materials to be produced, and the physi-
cal copying or recording costs. Under the current federal rules,
there are no limits to the number of requests a party can make for
discovery items as long as the requests are at least tenuously related
to the action. In one antitrust case, for example, the discovery stage
lasted almost a decade; the plaintiff's final pretrial statement was
over 10,000 pages long and cross-referenced approximately
250,000 pages of documents. 16
The life of the average civil lawsuit in federal court from filing to
completion is fourteen months. 17 One result of this lengthy process
is that attorney fees account for a substantial portion of all recov-
eries. In fact, when all the expenses of the litigation process are
added up, the claimants in tort cases often end up with compensa-
tion that amounts to only a small percentage of the total money
spent. For example, Professor O'Connell of the University of Vir-
ginia Law School estimated that only fourteen cents of the automo-
bile tort liability insurance dollar actually goes to cover economic
loss.' 8 A study by the Rand Corporation's Institute for Civil Justice
found that in 1985 the legal system incurred a total of $16-19 billion
15. AGENDA FOR CIVILJUSTICE REFORM, supra note 1, at 7-9.
16. Cf United States v. American Tel. & Tel., 642 F.2d 1285 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
17. David Gergen, America's Legal Mess, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 19, 1991, at 72.
18. Jeffrey O'Connell, An Alternative to Abandoning Tort Liability: Elective No-Fault Insurance
for Many Kinds of Injuries, 60 MINN. L. REV. 501, 511 (1976).
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in transaction costs to deliver $14-16 billion to plaintiffs in net
compensation. 19
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
In the past, punitive damages were assessed only in cases where
the defendant was proved to have had a quasicriminal intent to
harm the plaintiff. Today, however, plaintiffs in civil lawsuits rou-
tinely ask juries to award not only compensatory damages for their
economic or out-of-pocket losses, but also punitive damages. Juries
have responded with enthusiasm. A 1987 study by the Institute for
Civil Justice, examining 24,000 jury trials in Cook County, Illinois,
found that the average punitive damage award increased, in infla-
tion-adjusted dollars, from $43,000 in 1965-1969 to $729,000 in
1980-1984-ajump of 1500%.20 In personal injury cases, the rise
has been even more dramatic.
A prominent lawyer in Washington said that punitive damages
"have made civil litigation sort of like the lotteries you have in so
many states. '"21 Justice O'Connor observed that the "wholly
standardless discretion" of punitive damages "appear[s] inconsis-
tent with due process." 22 Now-retired Justice Brennan also noted
that juries "are left largely to themselves in making this important,
and potentially devastating, decision." 23 Commenting on one par-
ticularly shocking case, Judge Alex Kozinski of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit speculated: "I suppose next
we will be seeing lawsuits seeking punitive damages for maliciously
refusing to return phone calls or adopting a condescending tone in
interoffice memos." 24
The common law method of assessing punitive damages devel-
oped virtually without restriction. Lacking a unifying structure, the
current approach to punitive damages will continue to generate dis-
proportionately high awards in a random and capricious manner.
19. James S. Kakalik & Nicholas M. Pace, Cost and Compensation Paid in Tort Litigation, The
Institute for CivilJustice (RAND) No. R-3391-ICJ, at vii, ix (1986) (drawing data from Table
S.1, S.2, and S.3).
20. Mark A. Peterson et al., Punitive Damages: Empirical Findings, The Institute for Civil
Justice (RAND) No. R-3311-ICJ, at 4, 15 (1987) (drawing data from Table 2.7).
21. Ruth Marcus, Are Punitive Damage Awards Fair to Firms?: Supreme Court Finally Agrees To
Referee High-Stakes Disputes, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 1990, at HI (quoting Theodore B. Olson,
Esq.).
22. Banker's Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 88 (1988) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
23. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 281 (1989) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring).
24. Oki America, Inc. v. International, Inc., 872 F.2d 312, 315 (9th Cir. 1989) (Kozinski,
J., concurring).
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Because punitive damages are "quasi-criminal," an award should be
predicated on a standard of proof requiring some element of intent.
Other limitations are needed to restrict the measure of punitive
damages that can be levied in any single case. Plaintiffs seeking pu-
nitive damages should not be able to assign specific dollar amounts
to their request. Rather, punitive damages should be awarded in a
separate proceeding. A jury should determine whether punitive
damages are warranted based only on clear and convincing evidence
supporting an award; the trial judge should determine the amount
of punitive damages. The perceived benefits of punishment and de-
terrence can still be achieved by limiting the amount of punitive
damages to the full amount of compensatory damages. Punitive
damages reform reduces the threat of runaway jury verdicts, pro-
motes settlements, and increases certainty in commercial transac-
tions by establishing reasonable boundaries for awards. This six-
step approach will ensure that punitive damages are effective in de-
terring and punishing extreme or egregious conduct.
EXPERT WITNESSES AND "JUNK SCIENCE"
An area of the law particularly ripe for reform is expert witness
practice. The Federal Rules of Evidence, which govern most expert
testimony, eliminated many of the common law restrictions on the
use of expert witnesses. 25 The resulting uncontrolled use of expert
witnesses has led to longer trials, more expensive litigation, and a
reduction in the quality of expert testimony in many cases. It has
also allowed "junk science" to tarnish the legal process. Peter Hu-
ber, a leading observer of American courtrooms, has written re-
cently that "scientific frauds . . . are attempted almost daily in our
courts, and many succeed." 26 Huber wrote that "[t]he most fantas-
tic verdict recorded so far was worthy of a tabloid: with the backing
of expert testimony from a doctor and police department officials, a
soothsayer who decided she had lost her psychic powers following a
CAT scan persuaded a Philadelphia jury to award her $1 million in
damages."
27
25. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus., 505 F. Supp. 1313, 1322 (E.D. Pa.
1980) (discussing differences between common law and Federal Rules of Evidence pertaining
to testimony of expert witnesses). Contrary to common law, Rule 703 permits an expert to
testify to opinions formed on the basis of inadmissible evidence, provided that evidence is of a
type that an expert in a particular field would reasonably rely on in forming opinions or infer-
ences pertaining to that subject. Id.
26. PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 4 (1991).
27. Id. at 3-4.
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Stories such as this are becoming almost commonplace. "Expert"
witnesses regularly offer their "scientific" opinions on the connec-
tions between automobile accidents and breast cancer or environ-
mental pollutants and "chemically induced AIDS." 28 As if the
ability to fashion almost any opinion into expert testimony were not
enough, there is considerable use of contingency fees to pay expert
witnesses. Although expert witnesses are supposed to give objective
testimony based on scientific evidence in order to help judge and
jury resolve complex matters, this practice easily turns too many ex-
pert witnesses into "hired guns."
To eliminate testimony that is far afield from mainstream profes-
sional practice or current scientific knowledge, expert testimony
should be admitted only when it is based on "widely accepted" the-
ories. A party should have to prove that its expert's opinion is based
on an established theory that reflects a community of opinion. Cur-
rently, "expert" witnesses are permitted to offer testimony even if
their theories are unproven and not corroborated by other experts.
The Council's recommendations would allow testimony based on
respected minority or majority theories while excluding fringe
theories.
Contingency fees that award compensation in return for a "suc-
cessful outcome" in a case should be banned for expert witnesses.
A testifying expert witness should have no financial interest in the
outcome of the case. This reform is designed to keep expert wit-
nesses from becoming mercenaries or advocates instead of remain-
ing impartial and objective evaluators.
More comprehensive inquiries should be permitted of proposed
"expert" witnesses through interrogatories and depositions. Com-
pared to the discovery of other witnesses, discovery concerning ex-
perts is very limited.2 9 Litigants should be able to scrutinize experts
by obtaining more information about them. To this end, disclosure
of additional core data should be required-namely, a list of the ex-
pert's publications and a description of the expert's compensation
arrangement-without cost to the opposing party. Contrary to the
current rule requiring a court order before an expert witness can be
deposed, additional discovery through the use of depositions should
be permitted. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should be
28. See id. at 1 (stating that when subject of expert witness testimony has been discredited
by science, it is inappropriate to allow that testimony in courtroom).
29. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) (noting limitations on discovery of facts and opinions of
expert witnesses). Through interrogatories, a party only may be required to identify experts
to be called at trial, state the subject matter of their testimony, state the substance of the facts
and opinions of the testimony, and summarize the grounds for those opinions. Id.
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amended to provide for the deposition of experts without resort to a
court motion.
Finally, courts should be required to determine that proposed ex-
pert witnesses are legitimate experts in their field before they are
permitted to testify. This revision would involve judges directly in
protecting cases in their courtrooms from unqualified experts. It
should also have the effect of discouraging parties from retaining
unqualified experts. Furthermore, any attempt to mandate the use
of court-appointed experts should be discouraged to prevent the
proliferation of the practice.
ATTIORNEY FEES
The Council proposes an experiment in federal diversity cases
with a "Fairness Rule," based on the "English Rule," which requires
the losing party in a lawsuit to pay the prevailing party's attorney
fees. The proposal is grounded in fairness and the equitable princi-
ple that a party who suffers should be made whole. Adopting a
"loser pays" rule would provide those bringing a suit with a choice
of methods to finance their litigation and, at the same time, would
encourage the parties to evaluate their cases with greater care.
Before filing suit, parties would be compelled to consider whether
they have a realistic chance of prevailing. The Fairness Rule thereby
operates to discourage frivolous or harassment suits. On the other
hand, the rule would help fund meritorious claims not currently ini-
tiated when the cost of pursuing the claim exceeds the expected
recovery.
The loser would pay the winner's costs of vindicating its prevail-
ing position subject to three limitations. First, fee shifting would be
restricted to diversity jurisdiction cases in federal court. Second,
the amount of fees would be restricted to those the loser incurs.
This is to prevent a party from incurring disproportionate expenses
for purposes of penalizing the loser. Third, the court would have
the discretion to further limit fees where appropriate. Limiting the
application of the rule to federal diversity cases provides an option
for those litigants desiring that each party pay its own attorney fees
to pursue their cases in state courts. Thus, these recommendations
will not affect federal statutory rights that already provide for the
allocation of attorney fees in suits against the Government.
IMPLEMENTATION OF REFORMS IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
Executive Order 12,778 implements many of the reforms de-
scribed above in the executive branch of the Federal Government.
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Under the Executive order, federal agencies and litigation counsel
participating in civil litigation in federal court on behalf of the
United States are directed to follow certain guidelines.
Although the Executive order addresses numerous proposals,
several are of particular relevance to this discussion. First, no com-
plaint initiating civil litigation shall be filed without first making a
reasonable effort to notify all disputants and attempting to settle the
dispute.30 Second, settlement conferences shall be held and alter-
native dispute resolution procedures utilized where appropriate. 31
Third, litigation counsel on behalf of the Government is to make
efforts toward streamlining and expediting the discovery process,
including the disclosure of core information.3 2 Fourth, only testi-
mony based on widely accepted theories is to be presented and then
only from experts in the field who are not paid on a contingency
arrangement. 33 Finally, subject to reasonable limitations, fee shift-
ing agreements between the Government and other parties are en-
couraged whereby the losing party pays the prevailing party's fees
and costs.3
4
On February 4, 1992, the President transmitted the Access to jus-
tice Act of 1992 to the Congress. 35 Its principal provisions call for
federal courts to establish alternative dispute resolution procedures
as an option for settling controversies3 6 and require pre-complaint
notices as a condition of the right to sue in federal court.3 7 The Act
also permits experiments with the Fairness Rule for attorney fee
awards. 38
CONCLUSION
The use of litigation as a preferred means in our society for
resolving disputes and achieving social reforms has burdened the
courts and has resulted in significant economic detriment. The
President's Council on Competitiveness has proposed fifty specific
changes to the current process for civil litigation. Among them is an
increased emphasis on voluntary dispute resolution, including vol-
30. Exec. Order No. 12,778, 56 Fed. Reg. 55,195 (1991).
31. Id. at 55,195-96.
32. Id. at 55,196.
33. Id. at 55,197.
34. Id.
35. 138 CONG. REC. S909 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1992).
36. S. 2180, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 7, 138 CONG. REC. 911, 912; H.R. 4155, 102d Cong.,
2d Sess. § 7, 138 CONG. REC. 260, 261 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1992).
37. S. 2180, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 5, 138 CONG. REC. 911, 911; H.R. 4155, 102d Cong.,
2d Sess. § 5, 138 CONG. REC. 260, 260 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1992).
38. S. 2180, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 3, 138 CONG. REC. 911,911; H.R. 4155, 102d Cong.,
2d Sess. § 3, 138 CONG. REC. 260, 260 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1992).
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untary settlements. Limits are proposed for what has become a
time-consuming, burdensome, and expensive pretrial discovery pro-
cess. Punitive damages are restricted by requiring a higher standard
of proof in a separate proceeding before a trial judge in which spe-
cific dollar amounts cannot be requested and where the amount of
punitive damages is limited to the amount of compensatory dam-
ages awarded. The use of expert witnesses is restricted to those
who are truly experts in widely accepted theories prevalent in the
relevant professional field. In awarding attorney fees, the Fairness
Rule or "loser pays" rule is to be adopted in federal diversity cases
with some limitations.
The process of adopting these reforms, where appropriate, in liti-
gation involving the Federal Government has already begun with
guidelines in Executive Order 12,778, signed recently by President
Bush and in the transmittal to Congress of the Access to Justice Act
of 1992.

